We’ve Got Money, We Live It Up

According to the information published by Lex[1], the Budget and Finance Committee (BFC) of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) proposes changes to the Rules for Determination and Payment of Additional Remuneration. One of them is to abolish the ceiling of four salaries for the bonuses of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the Inspectorate of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), judges and prosecutors.

In this regard, we would like to remind the SJC that the budget waste related to the judiciary is of such a magnitude that Bulgaria ranks first in the European Union (EU) as regards the level of implemented justice budget as a share of the gross domestic product (GDP). The latest figures from the European Commission’s (EC) Justice Scoreboard for 2024 and Eurostat confirm the same[2].

Source: SEPEJ

At the same time, our country ranks between Kosovo and Senegal in terms of the rule of law according to the 2024 Rule of Law Index, and the EC notes that there is a “robust track record of prosecution and final judgments in high-level corruption cases”. This is not merely indicative of poor financial discipline — it points to a significant disparity between the public resources invested and the outcomes achieved, which appears less accidental and increasingly resembles a mechanism for securing loyalty.

In this context, removing the bonus cap appears not only unjustified, but downright cynical. Since judges and prosecutors normally receive bonuses no more than twice a year, and the budget surplus under the staff costs heading does not allow for large-scale payouts for all, abolishing the cap looks more like an attempt to increase personal wealth through generous bonuses for the members of the SJC themselves. In 2024, the latter allocated and disbursed to themselves bonuses equal to four basic monthly salaries (i.e., the current cap), totaling just over BGN 52,000 each.[3] Should the proposal to eliminate the cap be approved by the SJC Plenum, the members of the Council would be free to reward their own passivity and, indeed, their overtly harmful conduct by draining the remaining surplus in the budget.

Let us also recall that in the draft budget and the medium-term forecast of the judiciary proposed by the SJC (after all, the National Assembly adopted the draft of the Council of Ministers, which is lower), a significant increase in personnel expenses was projected for each year through 2028 with a particularly sharp rise in 2025. For example, the proposed average salary expenditure per magistrate per month was just over BGN 10 thousand in 2025 and reached BGN 13.4 thousand in 2028; for the members of the SJC themselves, the budgeted salary item increased from BGN 5 million in 2025 to BGN 6.7 million in 2028, translating to an annual allocation per council member of BGN 228 thousand in 2025 and up to BGN 303 thousand by 2028. Let us also not forget that the SJC (through the Prosecutor’s College) requested the reinstatement of career bonuses[4] (after the end of the term of office, to be restored to the position previously held, at the same grade, or one grade higher meaning to be promoted without competition). The form is irrelevant — what matters is that loyal service gets rewarded.

Removing the limit on the number of additional remunerations would in fact become a discretionary power that, according to the Venice Commission, should not exist because it threatens judicial independence[5]. Moreover, such “liberalization” of bonuses creates permanent internal inflation – an increase in the internal cost of labor without any real increase in its value and outcome. Thus, the judiciary becomes an encapsulated system that consumes more and more resources without returning added value to society in the form of fair and effective adjudication. Resources are channeled into self-preservation and privileges, rather than into reform, digitalization, or training.

In a country where the justice system suffers from severe deficits, any measure aimed at expanding access to financial privileges for those at the top of the hierarchy appears not only as a bold display of institutional self-indulgence, but also as economically detrimental. Instead of working to restore public trust through accountability, transparency, and efficiency, what is being proposed is a model of self-reward that undermines the fundamental social contract between institutions and citizens. It is time for the Supreme Judicial Council to demonstrate that it understands its role not as an administrator of privileges, but as a guarantor of judicial independence.

[1] https://news.lex.bg/%D0%92%D0%A1%D0%A1-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%B2-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%8A%D0%BB%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8-%D0%B2%D1%8A%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F/

[2] Chart 34 on page 44, which shows “actual government spending on the functioning of the justice system (excluding prisons) (…) as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)”

[3] https://www.capital.bg/getatt/4733500/

[4] https://ime.bg/articles/kratka-belezhka-po-zavryshtaneto-na-kariernite-bonusi-za-chlenovete-na-vss/

[5] Пар. 46, пар. 50 и пар. 51: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)004-e