An open letter to classical liberals on the Russia war on Ukraine and NATO response to it
By Krassen Stanchev
“Sometimes I feel shame for being a Libertarian”(a friend from Kyiv, after reading the appeal quoted below)
Just before NATO Summit Cato Institute published an Appeal “No to Ukraine in NATO”. Its argumentation was based on four assumptions derived mainly from history: (a) no “real threat” to US security if Russia wins the war it started in February 2024, (b) “high risk” of a nuclear war, (c) “dubious commitment” to enlargement and (d) high costs of support to Ukraine to win this war and excessive reconstruction needs for the post war period.
The Appeal’s mood was repeated a day later by an Open Letter, signed security experts from US think tanks and academia. Its core justification is based on foreseeing a future: “if Ukraine were to join NATO after the current war, the US and its allies would be understood to be making a commitment to fight Russian forces over Ukraine, should Russia invade again.”
Neither of these documents discusses the blatant and unprecedented violation of international law by the military campaign Russia launched on February 24, 2022. And they pay no attention to contamination impacts to global security of this war and the likely repetition of similar acts by Russia itself or other authoritarian regimes in the future.
The unprecedented nature of the aggression of Ukraine and the already actual contagious impacts of it had been analyzed by me and Professor Vesselin Popovsky eight months ago, taking into account lessons from the post-WWII history. Since then, the likelihood of such impacts has just become more obvious.
Based on history lessons and analysis of the scenarios of how this war may end, my appeal is this: NATO SHOULD JOIN UKRAINE.
And here are the key arguments.
Three possible scenarios to end the war on Ukraine[i]
- Ukraine wins, the West helps militarily and sanctions defeat Russia, and assists dismantling its current regime. The pre-war world order is back, and gets strengthened because this is a serious warning for possible future aggressors.
- Russia defeats Ukraine, eliminates her statehood, wipes out her culture, and successfully expands its own empire. Although the West will never recognize this conquest (as it was the case with the Baltic countries during their occupation by the USSR), Putin’s regime internally solidifies. The West has to either surrender, which is politically unimaginable, or sharply increase its or sharply increase its military spending to pre-1961 levels (roughly 6% of GDP). Other authoritarian regimes solidify as well and are tempted to launch aggressions of their own.
- A “Freezing the War” compromise whereby Ukraine retains its sovereignty but loses the invaded territories and agrees on some neutral status with limitations to its military capacities. This would mean that soon Russia will restore its military might, learn the lessons of its mistakes in the war, and next time would launch and more “effective” aggression. The likelihood of contagious effects and similar violations of the post-WWII order would increase to close to 100 percent.
Lessons from history
Neither of these scenarios eliminated the risk of a nuclear standoff or war. In the current situation, the first scenario has the potential to decrease such risks, the other two will keep Russia and not only Russia assured that “nuclear threats help, fundamentally.”
The same presumption of high risk of a nuclear war have been in fact supporting the Soviet Union aggressive international conduct between 1947 and 1989.
Germany was denazified. The Soviet Russia was not. The Russian Federation since 2007 officially claims it pursues a restoration of pre-1989 and pre-NATO-enlargement international status.
The supporters of the policies “no support for Ukraine” and “no Ukraine’s NATO membership” de facto and de ure support Russia’s claim to exclusivity from international rule of law. They also fail to learn from history.
The Soviet occupation of Central and Eastern Europe, the imposition of communist nomenklatura-KGB style of governance, and the customary oppression of protests and dissidents had a long-lasting detrimental effect on the societies of the region.
Every important attempt of armed resistance to Soviet rule in these countries (there were at least 15 such movements in USSR occupied Europe), or of individual and public initiative, cultural, trade-unionists, in the economic field, or international relations in these countries was only morally supported by the West. The nuclear risk presumption allowed for no bolder actions even after invasions of Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Adding up the time Soviet troops were stationed in each CEE country, the USSR occupation of Eastern Europe lasted for 142 years.
In 1989, according to different estimates, the Soviet troops stationed in the region counted 500-600 thousand men – approximately 10% of the Soviet military power. The threat (or at least the fear) of Soviet intervention was vivid until early 1989.
The total Soviet and Russia occupations of foreign territories by lasted for approximately 181 years. Not counting military Soviet presence in China, annexation Japan island and of Mongolia territories after the October Revolution and the World War Two but including territories of Georgia and Ukraine. (Its support to Maoist China or the installation of North Korea’s communist regime are not counted either.)
But in these 181 (or already 182) years I include Russian occupation of territories of Georgia, in Eastern Ukraine, and Crimea (in 2014). All these went unsanctioned because the same “presumption” of nuclear risk.
The Soviet occupation of European territories is divided as follows: 51 of the Baltic countries, 47 of Hungary, 17 of Poland and 14 of Romania, 5 of East Germany, 2 of Bulgaria and 2 of Czechoslovakia (1968-1969). The latter one is legally counted as occupation by the Warsaw Pact, but 80% of the troops were Soviet as well as 100% of the command.
The empty economic argument
The longer the Russian war, the higher the costs. The above scenarios 2 and 3 will, with absolute probability, lead to three-time higher defense budgets of the NATO countries and the global economy.
It is perhaps true that the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine will cost about one trillion USD, as the Cato Appeal estimated. This sum, however, is six time less significant than the probable USD 6 trillion defense cost per annum globally.
As the post WWII reconstruction of Europe had proven, the same experience repeated for Ukraine is likely to improve the prosperity of Europe, North America and the Planet. This is a prospect for post-Putin Russia as well.
Plus, it should be noted that economy of the Russian Federation is about 40 time smaller than the combined GDP of the NATO members and the countries that openly help Ukraine.
In other words, the risk of supporting, joining militarily and helping the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine is not only manageable but promises more pure economic benefit.
[i] See for details: Sanctions against Russia: Why and how they work, or should work, by Vladimir Dubrovskiy and Krassen Stanchev, Foreign Policy Center, August 10, 2022.
Dr. Krassen Stanchev teaches Public Choice, Macroeconomic Analysis of Politics and history of economic ideas to humanitarian post-graduates at Sofia University. He is also CEO of KC2 Ltd and Board Chairman, founder and former Executive Director of Institute for Market Economics (1993-2006), and MP and committee chairman at VII Constitutional Assembly of Bulgaria (1990-91).
After leaving IME, Stanchev continued to work on pro-market and tax reforms not only in Bulgaria but in the countries of the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Ukraine and other countries. He is a member of the MPS, of the Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), of the Wilhelm Roepke Institut in Erfurt, a Distinguished Professor of Tbilisi Free University in Georgia and Honorary Board Member of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
